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incomes, provide low prices to consumers, and attain rice self-sufficiency
in pursuit of food security.
Over the past three decades, however, the level and nature of these
government interventions and the relative importance of policy objectives
have changed in response to changes in the domestic rice demand and
supply factors, the macroeconomicenvironment, and the politicaleconomy
forces. Likewise, changes in the world rice and fertilizer markets and
technological developments through public and private international re-
search have had an equally important impact on the performance of the
Philippinerice economy and in shapingthe natureof government interven-
tions.
This paper aimsto analyze the changes in the Philippinericeeconomy
duringthe pastthree-and-a-halfdecades,andtoevaluate the policyoptions
in light of the prospective rice supply and demandsituation over the next
decade and beyond..
POLICY FRAMEWORK
Avariety of policyinstrumentshave beenadoptedtoachieve ricepolicy
objectives, i.e., price intervention policies to influencethe incentive struc-
ture, public expenditures for irrigation, researchand extension to increase
productivity,and land reform•to improvedistributionof factor incomesfrom
ricefarming.
Price Intervention Policies
Domestic rice prices have beendirectly influenced by the government
monopoly on internationaltrade and domesticmarketing Operationsunder
the National Food Authority (NFA).The NFA sets the level of rice imports
or exports based on the estimated gap between rice production forecast
and projecteddemand.toensureadequate ricesupply at politicallyaccept-
able.price levels. Domestic marketing operations are then undertaken to .
defend a uniform official farm floor price and retail ceiling•price across
seasons and geographic regions.DAVID AND BALISACAN: PHILIPPINE RICE SUPPLY DEMAND 235
Except in the case of fertilizers, import tariffs and advance sales tax
were the policy instruments directly affecting domestic prices of tradeable
inputs such as pesticides and farm machineries. The advance sales tax was
abolished in 1986, thereafter leaving only the import tariffs to continue
driving a wedge between domestic and border prices of tradeable inputs.
Quantitative trade restrictions imposed on fertilizers in the early 1970s were
also lifted in 1986.
Price incentives are affected not only by those commodity-specific
policies, but indirectly -- and often more importantly -- by economy-wide
policies that distort the exchange rate. The domestic currency had been
overvalued due to the industrial protection system and the unsustainable
deficits in the external account that were temporarily defended by foreign
borrowing and/or expansionary macroeconomic policies.
The impact of price intervention policies on price incentives from
1960-1994 are shown in Table 1.The trends in the nominal protection rates
(NPR) 1for rice, fertilizer, pesticides, and agricultural machineries measure
the impact of commodity-specific policies on their respective domestic
prices. The trends in effective protection rates (EPR)2 measure the com-
bined effects of output and input price policies on the value added of rice
production. The effect of exchange rate distortions (ERD) on rice value
added is reflected by the net effective protection rate (NEPR).
Overall, price intervention policies have not been favorable to the rice
sector, The government output price interventions have been aimed mainly
at insulating the domestic market from extreme price fluctuations. NPRs for
rice varied greatly over time and averaged about 9 percent between 1960
and 1994. Figure 1, which depicts the trends in domestic and border prices
in nominal and real terms, shows that domestic prices of rice are more stable
than their corresponding world prices. However, domestic prices have
1. NPRisthepercentage difference between domestic andborderpriceconverted atthe
officialexchange rate.Theorderpricerepresents thepricethatwouldhaveprevailed without
government, intervention.
2. EPRis the percentage differencebetweenvalued-added anddomesticborderprices
converted attheofficial exchange rates.236 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
TABLE 1
Trends in Nominal Protection Rates (NPR) of Rice, Urea,,Pesticides,
and Farm Machineries, Degree of Exchange Rate Distortion (ERD),
and Effective (EPR) and Net Effective Protection Rates (NEPR)
of Rice, Philippines, 1960-1994 (In %)
1960- 1965- 1970- 1975- 1980- 1985- 1990-
1964 1969 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994
NPRa
Rice 38 10 -1 -11 -8 11 25
Urea 49 55 -13 28 21 11 16
Pesticides 24 24 29 35 35 20 12
Tractors
2 wheel 24 20 21 46 46 30 28
4 wheel 24 20 21 24 24 10 10
Threshers 24 24 24 24 24 30 28
EPR 32 7 -3 -18 -15 -10 6
ERD b -20 -20 -20 -27 -27 -27 -36
NEPR 12 -13 -23 -45 -42 -37 -30




from1960-1984 thisalsoincludes anadvance salestax(10%and25%mark-up thatwas
abolished in 1986).
b1960-1989 fromIntal,P.andJ.H.Power(1991). Thefigures for1990-1994 werefromthe
ADBstudyon "Comparative Advantage ofEstateCropProduction: Selected AsianCoun-
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FIGURE 1
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generally followed the general trends in world prices. It is somewhat too
early to interpret whether the rising NPR for ricesince the 1980s is a sign
of growing protectionism in developedcountries, or whether it issimply an
adjustment mechanism to cushion the adverse effects on rice farmers of
the secular drop inthe world price of rice. It should beemphasized that the
downward trend i.nreal domestic price had not been reversed by the
increasing NPRs since 1980.
The common belief that government input price policy is intended to
increase farm incentives isnot borneout bythe patternof NPRs.Tradeable
inputs have generally received higher protection ratesthan rice output and
thus, the EPRs have beennegativeor low for most ofthe period.With trade
liberalizationand tax reforms inthe 1980s,NPRsfor tradeable inputs have
generallydeclined leadingto asmallpositive EPRfor riceintheearly1990s.
When the impact of economy-wide policies on the exchange rate is taken
intoaccount, the NEPRs for ricehave beensignificantly negative sincethe
mid-1960s. Indeed, distortions in the exchange rate turned out to be an
even more important source of bias against incentives to increase rice
productionthan commodity-specific policies.
Therefore, whether and to what extent price intervention policies will
become more or less favorable to riceproduction depends significantly on
the overall progress of trade liberalization.With the.growingacceptanceof
the principles of a more open economy and the country's membership in
the World Trade Organization (WTO), there are prospects for lower input
prices, less distorted exchange rates,and slightlyhigher world rice prices.
Underthe WTO agreement, the country isallowed to maintain quantitative
trade restrictions in rice for the next ten years. Moreover,the fact that the
minimumaccess requirementforriceimportsisvery low (50,000 rot)means
that the future nominal protection rate on rice will continue to depend on
domesticpolitical economy factors and not necessarilyconditioned by the
trade liberalizationpolicies under the WTO.DAVIDAND BALISACAN: PHILIPPINERICE SUPPLY DEMAND 239
PublicExpenditure Policies
Publicexpendituresforthe ricesectorare allocatedtoirrigationdevel-
opment,researchand extension,costof outputand inputpriceinterven-
tions, and cost of the land reform program.This sectionwill focuson
irrigation andresearch andextension, inwhichpublicexpenditures wilthave
a directimpactonfuturericeproduction. The landreformprogrambyand
large,hasbeenimplementedin the 1970sand no majorimpacton.future
productionis likelyto occur.The impactof government interventions on
outputand inputpricesdependsnotso muchontheirbudgetarycost,but
on how much input and outputpricesare affected. Nonetheless,the
budgetarycost of NFA operationis reportedin thissectionto showhow
budgetreallocationswithinthe rice.sectormay contributeto production
growth.
Irrigation
Irrigation in the Philippines has been predominantly the gravity type
whichtypically requires collective investment, operation,andmaintenance.
About half of theirrigated area is underthe communal-run-of-the-river
gravityirrigationsystemsthatservicelessthan1,000hectares.Forthese
systems,the government provides no-interest loansforcapitalinvestments
amortizedover 50 years; however,farmers' irrigatorsassociationsare
responsible fortheiroperations. The larger-sized nationalirrigation systems
whichare constructed, operated,and maintainedby the governmentac-
countfor about40 percentof irrigatedarea. Althoughirrigationfees are
charged, actual collectionsdo not fullycoverthe costof operationand
maintenance.Shallowand deep tubewell pumpsystems,whichservice
about10 percentof irrigated area, aremostlyfundedprivately.
Fig. 2 depictsthe trends in publicexpendituresin real terms for
irrigation;asa pointof comparison, thetrendsinpublicexpenditure forNFA
marketoperations inrecentyearsarealsoshown.Thepriorityaccorded to
irrigationexpansioninthe 1970suptotheearly1980sis clearlyindicated.
At itspeakin 1979-1980,expenditures forirrigationincreasedby 15times
more than the levelsin the 1960s. Irrigationexpendituresaccountedfor240 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
FIGURE 2
Trends in Public Expendituresfor Irrigation, MarketInterventions
(NFA), and Irrigation Expenditureas Ratio to Infrastructure
Investments and Public Expenditure forAgriculture, Philippines,
1960-1994
P million (1980 l_rlcea) (%)
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over 40 percent of total public expenditure for agriculture and nearly 20
percentoftotal spending ininfrastructure.Morethan90percentofirrigation
expenditurewas allocatedto nationalirrigationsystems.Althoughirrigation
investments have been historically the main policy instrumentto increase
yields and cropping intensity,the introduction of modern ricevarieties that
were suited toirrigatedand dry seasonconditionsaswell as the highworld
rice prices largelyexplain the acceleration of irrigation investmentsduring
this period (Hayamiand Kikuchi 1978).
With the sharp drop in world rice prices, foreign debt problems, and
severe budgetary squeeze from the early 1980s, public expenditures for
irrigation fell sharply in real terms as well as in proportion to the total
infrastructurebudgetand the total publicexpenditurefor agriculture.Aswill
be noted in a later section, irrigatedcrop area continuedto increase upto
1990 despite the sharp fall in irrigation expenditures.This is not only due
to the long gestation period of irrigation investments,but als0to the shiftin
irrigation investments from the large national irrigation systems to the
expansion of communal irrigation and rehabilitation of existing irrigation
systems.
Researchand Extension
The Philippineshashada fairly early historyof public effortsto raise
productivity throughriceresearchand extension.Fromthe earlypost-war
perioduptothe early1970s,improvedricevarietiesbredbythe Bureauof
PlantIndustryand the Universityof the Philippinesat Los BaSosgained
modestacceptance. Asthehigh-yielding, semi-dwarf,andfertilizer-respon-
sivemodernvarieties developedattheInternational RiceResearchInstitute
(IRRI) beganto be widelyadopted, however,nationalrice researchwas
phasedout bythe early 1970s.The governmentthenbelievedthatIRRI
can adequatelyserve the rice research needs of the country,and the
former'sscarcebudgetary resources couldbebetterallocatedtoextension
and researchonotheragricultural commodities, Indeed,extensionefforts
were strengthenedthroughproduction programs thatincludedsupervised242 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
credit, occasional fertilizer subsidies, and subsidized seeds (the so-called
Masagana 99 Program).
With the achievementof riceself-sufficiencybythe late 1970s,the drop
inworld prices of rice, greater budgetary constraints,and the slow-down of
technological development, public support for rice production programs
also dwindled. It was not until the late 1980s,when the country resumed
importing rice, that the government decided to develop a national rice
research program through the establishment of the Philippine Rice Re-
searchInstitute (PHILRICE). Beforethe 1980s,the priorityon irrigatedand
favorable rainfed lowland areaspursued by IRRIwas generally consistent
with the Philippine environmental conditions. But with IRRI's shift in re-
search priority toward upstream or strategic research and toward unfavor-
able environmental conditions.which were more predominant in other
countries,nationalriceresearch hasbecomeimperativetomaintainapplied
research on the irrigated and favorable areas. Moreover,.national rice
research which tends to behighly location specific,should have compara-
tive advantages in research on crop managementand on the unfavorable
areas.
Public Investments Prospects
With continued high population growth, limited land resources, and
rapid urbanization, prospects for growth in rice output depend critically on
the potentials for productivity growth.The latter,,in turn,depends to a large
extent on public investments in irrigationand rice research. Studies show
that given the prevailing low world rice prices, socially profitable invest-
ments in irrigation would be confined to the construction of smaller-sized
irrigation projectsand selective rehabilitation of existing irrigation systems
(World Bank 1991; Rosegrant et al. 1986). David (1992) also argues that
government assistance on aquifer characterization and drilling technology
improvementswill promote privatesector investments in shallowtube well
irrigation. Despite the government's apparent strong support for irrigation
as embodied in the recent passage of the Irrigation Act which sets an
ambitious target of irrigation expansion, the intent to accelerate irrigationDAVID AND BALISACAN: PHILIPPINERICE SUPPLY DEMAND 243
investments remains largely rhetorical. And it seems unreasonable to
expect that current budgetary allocation for irrigation will increase signifi-
cantly. This is not only because of very modest estimated social rates of
returns on irrigation projects but more importantly, investmentsin market
infrastructure, education, health, water, energy,and peace and order are
perceivedto have higher social ratesof return.
While there are no ex ante estimates of social rates of return for rice
research, there is a higher probability of substantially raising budgetary
resource for this,simply becausethe currentallocation isso low. A poten-
tially successful strategy for increasing budgetary allocationwould be to
arguefora reallocationofbudgetwithinthe ricesectorawayfromsupporting
NFAoperations towardproductivityenhancinginvestmentsin irrigationand
rice research. NFA budgetary cost is averaging about half of irrigation
expenditureand over 10times riceresearchexpenditures.Yet,the govern-
ment rice pricing policy can be achievedmore efficiently by using indirect
instruments, such as tariffs, rather than dissipating scarce government
revenues onthe administrativecost of direct market interventions.
Performanceof the RiceEconomy
Dramatic changes in the Philippine rice economy have occurred over
the past three decades.Beforethe introductionofthe modernricetechnol-
ogy in 1966,riceproductionwas growingat rates(2.1%), belowthat ofthe
population growth (Table 2). Between 1965 and 1980,the yearly growth
rate of rice production accelerated to 4.6 percent on average, and the
country turned from beinga net importer of 5 percent to 10 percentof its
annualrice requirementsto beingself-sufficient,and even a marginalrice
exporter by the late 1970s (Table3). Moreover,the rising trend in the real
priceof riceobservedduringthe early 1960sshiftedto a long-termdecline
after the mid-1970s(Fig. 5).
The strong growth performance in the late 1970s, however,was not
sustained into the 1980s.Growth in rice production (1.9%) again fell to a
rate belowthe populationgrowth ratewhich remainedata highlevel of2.3244 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
TABLE 2
Growth Rates of Palay Production, Area, and Yield by Production
Environment, 1960-1994 (In %)
1960-1965 1965-1980 1980-1994
Total
Production 2.1. 4.6 1,9
Area 1.6 12 -0.1
(76) (26) (-5)
Yield 0.5 3.4 2.0
(24) (74) (105)
Irrigated areas
Production 5.4 6.5 3.4
Area 5.3 2.6 2.1
(98) (40) (62)
Yield 0.1 3.9 1,3
(2) (60) (38)
Rainfed areas a
Production 0.8 3.7 -0.8
Area 1.0 1.2 -2.6
(125) (32) (-125)








a Data for rainfed and upland areas have been combined since 1980,AND BALISACAN: PHILIPPINERICE SUPPLY DEMAND 245
TABLE 3
Trends in Rice Production,lmpo_s, and Per Capita Availability,
1960-1994
Year Rice Net Availability
Production Impo_s per capita
(000 mt) (000 mt) (kg/cap)
1960 2,318 -2 84
1961 2,474 118 91
1962 2,557 87
1963 2,536 256 95
1964 2,538 300 97
1965 2,613 339 93
1966 2,653 108 86
1967 2,811 310 98
1968 2,893' -15 83
1969 3,179 -1 87
1970 3,459 -2 91
1971 3,416 379 101
1972 3,324 451 98
1973 3,501 308 96
1974 3,607 165 91
1975 4,148 147 100
1976 4,253 55 99
1977 4,715 -15 112
1978 4,688 -47 111246 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
TABLE 3 (Continued)
Year Rice Net Availability
Production Impo_s per capita
(000 mr). (000 mr) (kglcap)
1979 4,995 _127 110,
1980 4,970 -231 95
1981 5,142 -83 101
1982 5,417 -0 109
1983 4,742 -40 81
1984 5,089 190 97
1985 5,724 541 122
1986 6,010 110
1987 5,551 92
1988 5,831 151 101
1989 6,148 209 103
1990 6,058 593 113
1991 6,288 -10 102
1992 5,934 -30 88
1993 6,132 210 93
1994 6,850 99
Sources: Bureau of Agricultural Statistics.
National Census and Statistics Offi_.DAVID AND BALISACAN: PHILIPPINE RICE SUPPLY DEMAND. 247
FIGURE 3 ,
Trends in Palay Area and Yield, Total and by Production
Environment, Philippines, 1960-1994 (3-year moving average)
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FIGURE 4
Trends in the Adoption of Modern Varieties and Rate of Irrigated
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FIGURE 5
Trends In Relative Price of Rice (Pr) to the Whosale Price Index (WPI), Corn (Pc), Sugar (Ps),
and RelatiVe Prices of Farm inputs to Rice Price, Philippines, t960-1994 (3-year moving average)250 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
percent. Consequently, the country resumed being an importer of rice in
1984 and continued to do so in six out of the past 11 years. It should be
emphasized that, despite the slowdown in domestic rice production, the fall
in the real rice price which began in the mid-1970s continued to a point
where in the early 1990s it was only about 50 percent the average level in
the 1960s. Furthermore, the proportion of imports to total production is on
the average lower in 1984-1994 (less than 2.8%) compared to the 1960s
(5.4%). The fact that rice imports have not risen more rapidly despite the
lower growth of rice production than population suggests a declining
average per capita demand for rice in recent years.
Nature of Production Growth
Three distinct phases characterize the nature of growth in rice produc-
tion since the post-war period (Table 2 and Fig. 3). Before 1965, three-
fourths of the growth in rice production was accounted for by increases in
crop area, mainly through the opening up of the cultivation frontier. In
contrast, the acceleration of growth in rice production between 1965 and
1980 was achieved primarily through greater productivity. Yield doubled as
the annual growth rate increased sharply from 0.5 percent in 1955-1965 to
3.4 percent in 1965-1980. Increases Jnyield accounted for nearly 80 percent
of production growth, which was more than twice its contribution during the
previous period. Crop area planted to rice continued to expand, but at a
lower rate and mostly by increasing cropping intensity.
After 1980, the growth rate of production declined as crop area expan-
sion halted .and yield growth fell to 2.0 percent. In fact, increases in the area
planted due to increases inrice cropping intensity merely offset the.decline
in physical land area planted to rice in rainfed lowland and upland areas.
Thus, growth in rice production became completely dependent on yield
growth during this period.
The changing trends and nature of growth in rice production is consis-
tent with the trends in technological change, irrigation development, price
incentives, and the shifts in crop area planted to rice between favorable and
less favorable growing, production environment (see Figures 3 to 5). YieldDAVIDAND BALISACAN: PHILIPPINERICE SUPPLY DEMAND 251
andcrop areagrew rapidly between 1965-1980dueto irrigationexpansion,
widespread adoptionof MVs,and highlyfavorable output and input prices.
By the 1980s, real rice price has dropped quite sharply,adoption of MVs
has levelled off, expansion of irrigated area slowed down, and except for
fertilizers, input prices had risen relativeto rice prices. Rainfedand upland
rice crop areas contracted substantially as rice production ceased to be
profitable at the low real prices in these less favorable environments.
It is interestingto note, however, that despite these adverse develop-
mentsand rapidly increasing land prices, riceproductiongrew modestly,at
rates close to the pre-Green Revolution period. Moreover, real rice price
remained low, even as average rice imports were kept relatively low.This
suggests that there are other technological improvements occurring that
can only be reflected by measures of total productivity indices. Evidently
also, growth in demandfor rice isslowing down.
Indeed,thereare severalmajortechnologicaladvances raisingproduc-
tivity (lowering cost per unit of output) that cannot be easily measured
because ofboth conceptual anddata problems.For example,the changing
quality of MVs is notreflected inthe adoptionratevariable.Later generation
MVs had better eating quality, greater resistance to major pests and
diseases, shortergrowth duration, and moretoleranceto adverse environ-
mentalconditions, all contributing to increasingthe total factor productivity.
The introduction of herbicides together with rising wages led to the wide-
spread adoption of direct seeding, a labor-savingtechnology.Adoption of
integrated pest management has lowered the cost of production and has
also reportedly increased yields. Farmers' education and management
know-howare also improving.
Changing Demand Patterns
Demand for rice depends on its own price,prices of relatedcommodi-
ties, populationgrowth, changes inthe urbanratio,and changes in income.
Fig. 6 illustrates the trends in these variables (except for populationwhich
grew at about2.3%), together with the trends in the per capita availability
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Trends in Per Capita Availability of Rice, Real Domestic Retail Prices of Rice, Corn, and Wheat,
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of population growth largely determines the growth in total rice demand.
Rapidgrowthinaverageincomepercapitapriortothe 1980shasapparently
raisedconsumptionof rice percapita, despitethe risingtrend in own price,
and increasing urbanratio thatshould havea depressingeffectondemand
for rice.
During the 1980s, however,consumption of rice per capita began to
decline sothat total ricedemandgrewat a slightlyless ratethan population
growth. There are several explanations for this trend. Per capita income
hasdeclinedfrom its peak in 1980,which would reducedemandfor riceas
the estimated average income elasticity for the whole economy remains
positive. Since the average rice consumption per capita in urban areas is
lower than in rural areasfor avariety of reasons,the continued increase in
the urban ratioafter 1980would lowerdemandfor rice, It isalso interesting
to note the more rapid decline in domestic wheat price compared to rice
price in real terms, which would promote the substitution of wheat for
rice.Thischangingpricerelationshiphasbeenduebothto the liberalization
ofwheat imports andthe risingnominalprotection rateforrice, even as the




Becauseof the perceivedimportanceof riceself-sufficiencyas a policy
objective,projectionsof rice supplyand demand have often been per-
formed.Table4 presentsa summaryofthoseprojections inthe recentpast
by Rosegrantet al. (1986), the World Bank (1991), and Balisacanet al.
(1992).Thesearecomparedwiththeactualproduction, consumption, and
importsin 1990and 1995.
Severalimportant observations canbemadewhenpastprojections for
1990and1995arecomparedwiththeactuallevelsofproduction, consump-
tion,andimports.First, projected levelsof riceproduction turnedouttobe
significantly lowerthanactuallevels.Second, projecteddemandfor 1990254 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
TABLE 4
Summary of Selected Projections of Rice Production,
Consumption, and Imports, (000 mt) a
1990 1995 2000 2005
Production
Actual 6052 b 6560c -
Rosegrant et al. 5619 7238 -
World Bank - 6115 6565 -
Balisacan et al. 5753 5985 6294
Consumption
Actual 6229 b 6610 c
Rosegrant et al. 5911 7613
World Bank 6717 7537
Balisacan et al. 6544 7369 8356
Imports
Actual 160d 160d -
Rosegrant 292 313 375
World Bank 602 972





dAverage importsfrom1990-1994; average importsfrom1985-1994 is1.70,000 mt.
Sources: Balisacan, A.M.,R.L.Clarete,. A.M.Cortez.(1992),"TheFoodProbleminthe
Philippines: Situation, Issues, andPolicyOptions." FinalReport submitted to
theInternational FoodPolicyResearch Institute.
Rosegrant, M.W.,L.,&,Gonzales, H.E.Bouis,andJ.F.Sison(1986)."Price
andinvestment Policies forFoodCropSectorGrowth inthePhilippines."
DraftFinalReportofADBProject, "StudyofFoodDemand/Supply Prospects
andRelated Strategies forDeveloping Member Countries ofADB,"PhaseI1.
WorldBank(1991 )."irrigated Agriculture SectorReviewofthePhilippines,"
ReportNo.9848,Washington, D.C.DAVIDAND BALISACAN: PHILIPPINERICE SUPPLY DEMAND 255
and 1995 was fairly close to actual levels despite the.relatively simpler
methodology used in the estimation of underlying demand relationship
comparedtowhatisnowavailable. Third,projectedimportdemandfor 1990
and 1995is significantly higher than actualaverage imports for 1990-1994
(as well as the average for 1985-19914)mainly because the production
projections underestimatedthe actual values.
The fact that the projections underestimated the actual productions is
due largely to the inadequacyof the modern variety adoption rateused as
aproxy totechnological change inthese studies.As arguedearlier,the MV
adoption rate cannot adequately represent the complex nature of techno-
logicalchange. Changesin the characteristicsof modernvarieties (shorter
growth duration, bettereatingquality,greaterpest and diseaseresistance),
improvements in the quality of inputs such as herbicides and better pest
management and other crop managementtechniques, have continued to
increasetotal factorproductivitygrowth. Yet,MV adoptionratehasanupper
limit if 100 percent,and with the adoption ratealready reachingmore than
90 percent in the early 1980s, the assumed rate of technological change
during the projectionperiod was necessarilyquite low.Evidently,.however,
the rate of technological change has been faster than can be adequately
represented by the MV adoption rate. The use of rice research and
extension expenditures may be more appropriate than MV adoption rate.
But in the Philippines,there hasbeen nosignificantrice researchexpendi-
turedespite high ratesof MV adoptionbecause ofthe IRRI presenceinthe
country. Time series data on rice-specific extension are not available.
Furthermore,the impactofprivatesector innovations,suchas the introduc-
tionof herbicides,will notbetakenintoaccount.Propercautionmustsimply
be exercised on the interpretationof productionprojections.
Unlikethe analysisof ricesupply,the analysisofthe natureof demand
for rice in the Philippines has been more advanced analytically mainly
because of data availability. Rice demand function based on complete
demand system models has been estimated using time series aggregate
data (World Bank 1991)aswell as usinga pooledtime series-crosscountry
aggregate data (Huangand David 1992).And moredetailedspecifications256 JOURNALOF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
of rice demand functions estimated from complete demand systems have
beenpossiblewith the useof thetwo nationwide householdsurveys,These
are the Family Income and Expenditures Survey (FIES) periodically con-
ductedbythe NationalStatisticsOfficesince1957used byBalisacan(1994)
and the Food and NutritionResearch Institute(FNRI)consumption surveys
in 1978, 1982,and 1987used by Bouis (1991).
Supply.Demand Simulations
Inthissection,the Rosegrant-RozenFoodCropSupply/DemandSimu-
lation Model(Rosegrantand Rozen, 1993)isemployedto assessthe likely
medium- and long-termpatterns offood crop production,consumption and
trade for rice, corn,sugarcane, coconut, and wheat in the Philippines.This
modelalso permitsthe assessment offuturefood supply/demandbalances
under alternative policies on output and input prices, irrigation investment,
and agricultural technology.
For the Philippine application of the model, three regions (Luzon,
Visayas, and Mindanao),two locations(urban and rural), and four income
groups (quartiles)are specified.Baselinedataon production,consumption,
income, and population reflect actual values in 1993;for net imports,the
data arefive-year averages. (Thesevaluesthus reflectthe effectsofvarious
policies, both economy-wideand sector-specific, prevailing in that year as
well as in previous years.) Food demand parameters are based on esti-
mates in Balisacan (1994). Supply-sideelasticities are based on previous
studies, including the authors' perception of the underlying production
relationships in Philippineagriculture.
Owing to the very limited informationonthe responsesof quasi-inputs
(food crop land area, irrigation, extension) and technology (MV,crop
intensification) to changes in relative sectoral incentives, factor endow-
ments,and institutions,the authorsopted to "close" the Rosegrant-Rozen
model by specifying total crop areaand technology as exogenous. To the
extentthat quasi-inputsand technologyare policy choices, this introduces
biases in the simulation results, but the other option of simply using
"informed" guesses basedonestimatesfor other countriesisnot necessar-DAVID AND BALISACAN: PHILIPPINERICE SUPPLY DEMAND 257
ily more informative. Because of the absence of reliable data, it has not
been possible to estimate econometrically the underlyingdeterminants of
investmentsin quasi-inputs and technology;
The following key assumptionsare madefor the base simulation:
(1)an averageaggregateincome growthof 3.0percenta yearfor both
urban and rural areas;
(2) an average population growth rate of 1.9 percent a year for rural
areas and 2.9 percent a year for urban areas;
(3) constant real prices of food commodities;
(4) anannualincrease of 1 percentin areaplanted to riceMVs and an
annual increase of 0.5 percent in irrigated paddyarea; and
(5) an annualincrease of 3.0 percent in area planted to high-yielding
corn varieties.
Assumptions concerning the growth of irrigated riceareas and areas
planted to modern corn varieties reflectactual values in the secondhalf of
the 1980sand early 1990s.Thus,the baselinesimulationassumesthat in
the medium- to long-term the agricultural price and investment policy
regimes will remainessentially the sameas they were in recent years.
The baselinesimulation resultsfor riceand corn are reportedin Table
5. Domestic production of rice reaches 7.9 million metric tons in the final
year (2010) of the simulation period.This representsanaverage increase
of 1.7 percent a year.Rice consumption grows at a much fasterrate--3.0
percenta year. Net importsof ricethus risefrom 0.15 millionmetrictons to
1.66 metric tons at the end of the period. In the case of corn, production
grows from about4.8 millionmetrictons to 8.1 millionmetrictons, or at an
average growth rate of 4.0 percent a year. Domestic corn consumption
increases at an average annual rate of 5.3 percent a year, reaching 8.2
million metric tons at the end of the period. Net imports of corn rise from
virtually zero to 1.07million metrictons at the end of the simulationperiod.
Table6 assumesa higher productivitygrowthin riceand cornthanthat
assumed in the basesimulation. The policyhandlesareirrigation,technol-258 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
TABLE 5
Base Simulation, Philippines
Year Area Yield Production Consumption Net Imports
(000 ha) (mtJha) (000 mt) (000 mt) (000 mt)
Paddy Rice
1993 3,283 2.88 6,150 6,324 153
2000 3,314 3.15 6,810 7,504 693"
2005 3,358 3.36 7,354 8,484 1,140
2010 3,412 3.57 7,933 9,595 1,662
Corn
1993 3,149 1.52 4,795 4,795 0
2000 3,306 1.79 5,932 6,229 297
2005 3,434 2.02 6,934 7,543 610
2010 3,561 2.27 8,074 9,145 1,071DAVID AND BAilSACAN: PHILIPPINE RICE SUPPLY DEMAND 259
TABLE 6
Productivity Growth Simulations, Philippines
Year Area Yield Production Consumption Net Imports
(000 ha) (mt/ha) (000 mt) (000 mt) (000 mr)
A. High productivitygrowth
Paddy Rice
1993 3,238 2.88 6,150 6,324 153
2000 3,318 3.29 7,101 7,504 403
2005 3,371 3.59 7,888 8,484 596
2010 3,435 3.93 8,791 9,595 804
Corn
1993 3,149 1.52 4,795 4,795 0
2000 3,317 1.86 6,166 6,256 90
2005 3,453 2.14 7,386 7,576 191
2010 3,586 2.46 8,819 9,191 372
B. Low productivity growth
Paddy Rice
1993 3,283 2.88 6,150 6,324 153
2000 3,307 3.00 6,457 7,504 1,047
2005 3,343 3.08 6,718 8,484 1,767
2010 3,386 3.17 6,991 9,595 2,604
Corn
1993 3,149 1.52 4,795 4,795 0
2000 3,296 1.73 5,705 6,203 498
2005 3,417 1.90 6,485 7,509 1,024
2010 3,538 2.08 7,365 9,105 1,740260 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
ogydevelopment, and MV adoption.The parametervalues for these policy
variables are assumed to be 50 percent higherthan those assumed in the
baseline. The results show a substantially different picture of food sup-
ply/demand balances. Net import of riceat the end of the simulation period
is about 0.86 million metrictons lower than that in the baseline case. Net
import of corn also falls by about 0.7 million metric tons.
The bottom panel of Table6 shows the implication of low productivity
growth onriceand corn supply/demandbalances. Thesimulationassumes
that the parameter values for irrigation,technology and MV adoption are
lower by 50 percent than those assumed in the base case. As expected,
low productivity growth results in a substantial buildupof food imports. Net
riceimports riseto about2.6 millionmetrictons at the end ofthe simulation
period, while net corn imports increase to 1.7 millionmetric tons.
The limitation of this exercise must be noted. First, the simulation
model, as presently set up, is incapable of adequately capturing the
character of technological improvementsin corn and rice production. Rice
varietal improvements, for example, have taken various forms, including
the development of pest- and drought-resistant varieties. Second, the
estimates of net imports may be biased upwards owing to the likely
over-estimation of consumption as aggregate incomeincreases over time.
In the model, although (the absolute value of) income elasticities for rice
and corn are inversely related to income, the overall rate of growth of
consumption may not fall overtime since consumers are grouped into
quartiles rather than income levels.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Paststudies aimedat prospective policyanalysis often have analyzed
policy options from the viewpoint of minimizingthe import gap (Rosegrant
etal. 1986;World Bank 1991;Balisacan et al. 1992). Firstof all, projecting
the import gap fairly accurately has proven to be elusive. And given the
inherentdifficulties in estimatingrice supply functionswith available Philip-
pine data, it is difficult to beoptimistic in being able to do so successfully.DAVID AND BALISACAN: PHILIPPINE RICE SUPPLY DEMAND 261
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The paper's current projections of the import gap will likely prove to be
overestimated. Thus, why start from that perspective at all, is not altogether
a moot question.
In the Philippine case, rice self-sufficiency has ceased to be a dominant
policy objective, and this is just rightly so. From the 1940s up to the late
1970s when world rice prices were relatively high, the rice self*sufficiency
objective may have been consistent with efficiency objectives (Fig. 7). But
the observed long-term trends in real world rice price tend to indicate that
the current low world price may actually be reflective of the future; i.e., the
high world rice prices in the 1940s to the late 1970s were the.deviations
from the long-term trend.262 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
In any case, the Philippine government and the public at large have
increasingly accepted the fact that a more open economy would best serve
the welfare of the Filipino people. Hence, food Security concerns may be
better addressed by being self-reliant, i.e., capable of purchasing rice
anywhere, rather than being self-sufficient at lower levels ofwelfare. Viewed
from that perspective, the projected import gap may have little policy
relevance in the Philippine context. (This may not be the case for large
countries such as India, China, Indonesia, or Bangladesh where small
changes in trade gap may have significant repercussions in the world
market.)
In the pursuit of long-term efficiency objectives, what would be the likely
impact of government policies on rice seJf-sufficiency ratios? This paper's
analysis of price intervention policies indicate that when domestic rice
output and input prices are allowed to reflect their true social opportunity
costs through appropriate domestic policy reforms, price incentives will
improve and rice production will consequently increase. Global trade liber-
alization is also projected to increase world rice price and therefore domes-
tic price incentives,
Moreover, the second-round effects of global trade liberalization would
also indirectly increase production by raising the social profitability of
productivity-enhancing public investments, such as irrigation and rice re-
search. 3
What are the current policy, issues with respect to the Philippine rice
sector? While there are many, this paper highlights two important ones. First
is the continuing dissipation of the scarce government budget on the NFA
marketing operations, which is about P1.5 billion. Second is the apparent
under investment in rice research.
3. Asinternational researches onirrigation andricecultivation alsoincrease, theefficiency of
national riceresearch andirrigation will potentially increase further, triggering third-round positive
effects onsocial profitability ofdomestic public investment inrice.While world rice pricemay
decline asaresult ofrapid technological progress, thiswilllikely benefit thepoor through lower
foodprices andpotentially greater income toredistribute through appropriate fiscal policies.DAVID AND BALISACAN: PHILIPPINERICE SUPPLY DEMAND 263
Current riceresearch expenditureisaboutone-fourthofone percentof
gross value added in rice. Using the arbitrary target of 1 percent for
agricultural research in lessdevelopedcountries,afour-fold increasein the
current Philrice budget or about P300 million of additional budgetary
allocation will berequired. Reallocatingthe NFA currentbudget to achieve
rice research expenditure targets will still leave about P1.2 billion unsour-
ced, representingaboutathirdofcurrent irrigationbudget.Ofcourse, social.
profitability of public investmentsin ricemust be evaluatednot only among
alternativeswithin thesector,butcomparedwith publicinvestmentsoutside
the rice sector.